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Who Wants Collective 
Bargaining Any Way? 
A. W. R. Carrothers 
Collective bargaining in Canada is undergoing strains 
today, as it has in différent circumstances, which are challeng-
ing the process and are causing responsible people to question 
whether it can be improved or should be replaced. 
Canada may be described as a bilingual, multicultural, regionally 
oriented, determinedly pluralist society, with a mixed enterprise economy 
and a three-tiered fédéral System of responsible government, rooted in a 
public légal System, fostering individual freedom, civil liberties and 
collective rights, in search of the « humane society ». Those words 
encapsule, with thumbnail inadequacy, the basic characteristics of the 
country and the kinds of values adhering to its peoples. 
Collective bargaining is, among other things, a System for the régu-
lation of employer-employée relations. Of numerous possible Systems, it 
is the one that is most compatible with those characteristics and values 
which we hâve so far been able to create. It is a stratagem to be judged 
by what it does. It has limitations and flaws which should be assessed 
and understood and, where appropriate, remedied. But if basic change 
to the System is to be effected we should be satisfied that the whole of 
what we think we stand to gain is worth more to us than the whole of 
what we may stand to lose. 
A CONVENTIONAL HISTORICAL RATIONALE : 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE « FREE MARKET » 
Collective bargaining in Canada is undergoing strains today, as it 
was under différent conditions, which are challenging it and are causing 
responsible people to question whether it can be improved or should be 
replaced. There is danger of throwing the baby out with the bath water, 
and I think it is now time to take a good look at the baby. 
Like ail babies collective bargain-
ing had an umbilical cord, the In-
dustrial Révolution of the 18th 
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century, which drove craftsmen and common labourers alike from the 
tools of their trade, off the land, and from their station in the feudal 
estate, into the towns and cities, where misery sought company. 
Like ail babies, collective bargaining had a mother and a father. 
The mother was the labour force — the new labour movement — trade 
unionism — who had a spécial instinct for the protection, the care and 
feeding, of the child. It also had a father : capitalisme who took his 
pleasures not thinking of the conséquences and horrified at what he had 
sired. The father would prefer to deny responsibility, for he never really 
married the girl, only maintaining support under compulsion and fear of 
a paternity suit. History has yet to say whether the conception of collective 
bargaining resulted from an act of fiery séduction, of râpe, or of common 
consent. At least it was not the product of humdrum routine, for labour 
and capital were not wilfully living together without benefit of clergy. 
Yet there is not much doubt as to who was getting what. 
Like ail babies, collective bargaining has a life of its own — a 
purpose for living and a right to live independent of parental opinion and 
certainly free of any asserted power of life and death. What then is its 
purpose for living ? 
« Conventional wisdom » dictâtes that we are enjoying the good life 
of démocratie free enterprise. It is claimed to be the prevailing spirit in our 
society. Given the démocratie component in the formula, trade unionism 
is a power that countervails against enterprise, and collective bargaining 
is a mechanism through which the two powers meet, confront and com-
promise their différences. Collective bargaining is a mechanism by which 
democracy may be brought to industry. It is a mechanism by which social 
justice can be pursued in the work-place. Collective bargaining is thus a 
natural concomitant of private enterprise, because without it the social 
justice which it produces or promises would be sought through the State ; 
and the discharge of this responsibility through the State would be the 
beginning of the end of private enterprise. Is it any wonder that collective 
bargaining is a love-hate relationship ? Is it any wonder that the more we 
hâve of it the more we question conventional assertions of dominance and 
subservience ? of role-playing ? of interdependence ? In times of présent 
trouble, in which collective bargaining appears to exacerbate problems, 
it is not surprising that people see salvation in change. 
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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AS A PROCESS FOR MAKING DECISIONS 
Having offered very briefly a fairly conventional rationale for collec-
tive bargaining as one of a number of possible industrial relations Systems, 
I should like to dwell on a more broadly-based appraisal of it as a process 
for taking décisions. 
In seeking a framework within which to analyze and appraise decision-
making processes at large, I hâve found myself considering five questions : 
1. what is the dimension or order of magnitude of the issue to be 
decided ; 
2. what is the nature of the issue ; 
3. what is the character of the process itself ; 
4. what is the quality of the décision ; and 
5. what process will likely or should be used. 
The dimension or order of magnitude of an issue 
There is great variation in the dimension or order of magnitude of 
the issues to be decided by collective bargaining, from matters of funda-
mental principle to the mère acceptance of précèdent. Most issues occupy 
a middle range. A principle is something that is not easily compromised or 
cast aside, and there is much danger in misconceiving a matter of self-
interest with one of principle. Many an impasse has been thus produced 
and many an intermediary has been hard-pressed to facilitate the negotia-
tion of a reasonable reconciliation of conflicting interests while allowing 
a party to feel he has gained his point of principle. 
The nature of an issue 
The nature of collective bargaining issues is of course wide-ranging. 
Historically, I hâve suggested, collective bargaining developed in response 
to the adoption of the theory of the free market and to provide acceptable 
participation in it by the labour force, although there were a number of 
other justifications from which, over time, there has been much fallout. 
Since this paper can be no more than a cursory appraisal in any event, 
I should like to dwell on only one facet, the political. 
We are accustomed to recognize the political élément in the collective 
bargaining process. But there can be an important political élément in the 
complex nature of the issue. It is manifest where the process is used for 
ulterior political purpose : to challenge the policies of the government 
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of the day, to seek a change in the government of the day, or even to 
seek a transformation in political structures. Each gives shape to the issue 
to be resolved. Each in its own way is a challenge to the sovereign authority 
of the government. Where the trade union movement is an intégral part 
of the political process, as it is in a number of Western European countries 
in varying forms and degrees, the first two of thèse objectives may be 
attainable, in some form or in some degree, within the System. Where 
the trade union movement is not so integrated, as tends to be the case in 
North America, the collective bargaining process takes from the nature 
of the issue such a substantially différent character that students of con-
ventional industrial relations may not recognize it as belonging or relating 
to an industrial relations system. As a Western Canadian student of 
industrial relations I hâve long accepted that Québec is a province not 
like the others. I encountered not long ago the assertion — it was an 
indigenous one — that the effective de facto Opposition to the économie 
and social policies of the government of the day is to be found not so 
much on « the other side of the House » as within the labour movement. 
The potentialities of trade unionism go far beyond participation in collec-
tive bargaining. I do not présume to judge the truth or falsity of the 
assertion ; but it is an observation which I find will not allow itself to 
be dismissed abruptly. If it is a fair observation, the character of the 
issue will affect the character of the process, and sanctions and settlements 
may hâve little to do with a more restricted concept of collective bargaining. 
The character of a process 
The character of the collective bargaining process is that of a 
synthesis of a great rnany processes. 
The process has two engines, the main and the spare. The main 
engine is a highly complex affair ; some parts are concurrent, some sequen-
tial, as witness the uniquely Canadian strategy of postponing the right to 
resort to économie sanctions. There is the économie component of the 
marketplace : coincidence of the forces of supply and demand. There is 
a psychological component at the bargaining table, well undestood by 
masters of the craft, and not always clearly distinguishable from poker 
or chess. There is a central administrative component in the rôle o»f labour 
boards, from the disposition of bargaining rights to the administration of 
the collective agreement. There is a légal component, including the rôle 
of the courts and the functions of arbitration. There is a moral component, 
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for instance in defining the rôle of the intercéder : is he there to discover 
what will work or to détermine what is « fair » ? 
From the outset there is a political élément in the process because 
the System has been embraced by governments as public policy and can 
be withdrawn in the name of public policy. Industrial conflict may be 
put into the public domain through the work stoppage and attendant 
publicity through which the contestants may each seek to recruit sym-
pathetic public opinion. In a free market with easy substitution of goods 
and services, public opinion may provide little comfort to either party. 
In a restricted market, the sanction of the work stoppage impinges on the 
user or beneficiary who is not a party to the dispute. At what point that 
préjudice passes the limits of public tolérance is a neat political question. 
Where work stoppage in an essential service becomes intolérable, the 
the government is pressed to exercise sovereign power such as to override 
in the private sector the process which the government has adopted as 
public policy, and to replace itself as employer in the public sector with 
itself as sovereign. Seulement is no longer the product of collective 
bargaining but of the political process. 
The auxiliary engine is driven by the économie force of the work 
stoppage. It turns on when the first one falters. Although it sometimes 
anticipâtes failure of the main engine, its potential start-up is often what 
keeps the main eccentric Rube Golberg machine functioning. 
The process présents itself as one of bargain and agreement. But, 
like a Mother Hubbard dress, what consensus conceals can be more 
interesting than what it reveals. Behind the consensus there often is 
nothing more than a temporary truce, which makes the process look more 
like one of coincidence than consensus. Yet the collective agreement so 
long as it lasts binds the parties together. The process was described a 
quarter century ago as one of antagonistic coopération. It can of course 
be one of consensus based on a récognition of common interests ; cir-
cumstances indeed alter cases. 
The quality of a décision 
The quality of the décision produced by collective bargaining basically 
is normative : it prescribes the terms and conditions under which the 
parties are to live together. There may be descriptive éléments, but those 
are more likely to be hortatory and polemical, producing rhetoric for 
other occasions. The sanctions tend to be légal, but not exclusively so. 
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The décision is of course heavily économie, with clear social im-
plications. The labour factor of production is competing with others for 
the spoils of the market. The market for labour itself is not free, but that 
is what collective bargaining as social policy is about. 
PRESENT THREATS TO THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SYSTEM 
The sources of présent threats to the collective bargaining system 
appear to be five : 
(1) an alarming increase in man-hours lost through work stoppages, 
accompanied by a rise in the rate of rejection by union members of 
tentative settlements ; 
(2) an increase in wage settlements substantially in excess of the rate 
of inflation and any increase in national productivity ; 
(3) an increase in the number of illégal work stoppages and other forms 
of unlawful behaviour ; 
(4) an increasing politieization of disputes ; and 
(5) an accumulation of public and private harm from disputes in essential 
services. 
( 1 ) Time loss figures provide no cause for complacency, but they should 
be kept in perspective. The direct and indirect effects of work stop-
pages on productivity can vary tremendously. Further, they are only 
one cause of time and productivity loss, and a minor one at that, 
compared with illness, absenteeism, accidents, breakdowns, logistical 
failures and bad weather. Moreover, work stoppage figures are only 
a crude proxy for hard data on the real condition of industrial relations. 
(2) Studies suggest that collective bargaining is a neutral mechanism 
which of itself is not inflationary : it may reinforce a deflationary 
environment ; at the same time there is little doubt that it tends to 
act as an accelerator in an inflationary environment. 
(3) The danger of illegality goes much deeper than the présent labour 
relations environment. Flouting of the law is being rewarded by under-
takings not to purse légal remédies as a condition of settlement. It 
is becoming a legitimate question whether the law is to be viewed 
as a norm to be adhered to or merely as a guideline from which 
déviations may be measured. Among other things, such déviations 
are bound to hâve their impact on leadership : where illegality is the 
order of the day, leaders will tend to surface to accord with the order. 
(4) The political component in collective bargaining has escalated sub-
stantially. The curve of accélération of ad hoc législation matches 
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that of public inconvenience. Other évidence can be derived without 
difficulty from last winter's public press. 
(5) Observers sensé that the rising accumulation of public and private 
harm is leaving a residue of bitterness the social significance of which 
is difficult to assess, and which présents one of the most important 
unknowns in public affairs today. 
CAUSES OF THE THREATS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AS PUBLIC POLICY 
The source of problems in collective bargaining is less in what is 
happening in the labour management system than it is in external forces. 
There are today three major causes of the threats : unemployment, lack 
of productivity, and inflation ; and the greatest of thèse is inflation. 
The good news is that although unemployment is high, in other 
countries it is higher ; although productivity is down, it is not out ; and 
although we hâve double digit inflation, other countries hâve it worse. 
That, of course, is not good enough. Unemployment, however it may be 
offset by insurance and welfare schemes, créâtes an environment of inse-
curity which is being reinforced by a drop in productivity and a persistent, 
unacceptably high rate of inflation. Unemployment is undiscriminating, 
and when it bites hard it hurts hard. Productivity fell off in the second 
half of 1974 and did not start to recover until the summer of 1975 ; where 
there is no growth there is no play in the System, no cushion for short-falls 
or catch ups. The silent thief of inflation is eroding the social fabric by 
forcing more people to become more dépendent on the state. It is eroding 
the political fabric through regeated failure of the political System to master 
it and through repeated toleration of or accommodation to uncivil diso-
bedience engendered by it. It is eroding collective bargain by inciting in-
creased rejection of tentative settlements, the imposition of ad hoc political 
and quasi-judicial settlements, and a growing sensé of injustice over the 
processes of voluntary arbitration. The product is not merely a short-fall 
in expectations, even expectations discounted by adversity : it is an enor-
mous threat to individual security and to relative well-being. It générâtes 
aliénation from the présent and the future — a form of « social disen-
gagement » in which the individual becomes indiffèrent to the impact of 
his claims on his today, let alone on the conséquences for his tomorrow, 
and in which « beggar my neighbour » becomes part of the culture. In-
flation is redistributing wealth with a vengeance, and in so doing it is 
redesigning the social dynamic. Free collective bargaining was never 
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planned to accommodate such strains ; it cannot carry the burden alone, 
and it should not take the blâme. 
ASSESSMENT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
In judging the System today we should not allow our attention to be 
deflected by the fact that, being now under attack, it tends to be defended 
in public debate by those who appear to stand to gain by its use or by 
those who sensé that they stand to lose by advocating its constraint or 
élimination. At the same time, it is, I submitted in the statement of my 
thesis, a stratagem, and should be judged accordingly. As a system of 
industrial relations it is not the only game in town. Yet, if there is to be 
systemic change we should be careful about what we buy in the form 
of relief from présent dilemmas and what we pay for the change in terms 
of values, freedoms and interests. At présent, collective bargaining ac-
commodâtes a host of forces and produces a vector the strength and 
direction of which is the sum of those forces. Is the object of change to 
change that vector ? If so, to what direction and with what force ? and 
with what impact on the component forces ? And are we sure that our 
présent discontent is really rooted in the industrial relations System ? 
We hâve already seen shattered the myth that inflation and unem-
ployment occupy seats on a seesaw and that as one goes up the other goes 
down ; a government, so runs the myth, by manipulating the fulcrum can 
bring about the balance which its policy dictâtes. We hâve witnessed the 
inability of government to constrain inflation with levers it judges to be 
acceptable. Governments hâve a larger pièce of the économie action than 
ever before. One can't help wondering whether that very participation has 
weakened the leverage of économie policies which governments appeared 
to hâve had in earlier times. What appears to remain now is the prospect 
of a consensus in favour of voluntary restraint, a consensus which a 
projection of présent trends tells us is not a high probability. I wonder 
also whether thèse developments are not reflected in the admission of 
the Minister of Finance in his May budget speech that « if we expected 
restraint from the country, the country expected restraints form govern-
ments ». 
The magnitude and rate of growth of impingement of government 
activities at ail levels on the lives of individuals — in some respects to 
the point of pre-emption — are giving rise to an insistent distinction 
between public interest and government interest. Government activities 
— or enterprises — can and do take on a will of their own that is not 
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quite the same as the will of public policy that created them. They bear 
the name of government but they carry their own gènes. It is not a novel 
distinction ; but perhaps it is fortuitous that the distinction should be 
assertive now, lest we slip into a false consensus that the interests are 
identical. The only case of identity that seems at ail persuasive is that of 
a newly elected government that has had no time to do anything ; but 
even there the very inheritance of orderly change mars the identity. Thus 
there may be perceived a distinction between government policy levers 
and public policy levers : and for the former to be effective, both may 
hâve to be seen to operlap. 
And so I fall back on Karl Popper's « Open Society », with which 
collective bargaining appears to be congenial, which he offers as providing 
« a forum for the free and untrammeled propounding of alternative solu-
tions and [having an approach which] is superior to any alternative, even 
when ail moral considérations about freedom and other values are left 
aside ». I sensé a certain harmony between that and two further public 
statements of last May. The Minister of Finance in his budget speech 
stated that the severe use of fiscal and monetary restraint, with whatever 
price it commanded in unemployment, « would be completely at odds 
with my own instincts ». A brief report of a speech of the Prime Minister 
in Montréal at the end of May reads as follows : « Officially during his 
tour, he stuck to the policy that inflation in Canada can best be managed 
by the exercise of voluntary restraint in the différent sectors of the eco-
nomy. More convincingly (italics added), he expounded on the économie 
and civil drawbacks of compulsory controls on income and priées ». One 
can taste the sait air of journalistic pragmatism. 
Collective bargaining is now so much a part of the fabric of our 
country that I suspect that substantial change will corne about only 
with the atténuation of pluralism and diversity on which it is built. Centri-
petal forces are not a gracious host to collective bargaining, as they are 
not to other interests. It may be that collective bargaining will become a 
spécifie électoral issue and the electorate will opt, for whatever reasons, 
for centralized authority over présent pluralism. It may be that our social-
economic-political System is fated to grind slowly to a crawl. And we 
should not dismiss as implausible the prospect that we may be on the 
eve of a transformation in political structures. It can happen hère. 
I described Canada as a pluralist society and collective bargaining 
as a decentralized process. That is the way the process was designed and 
that is the way it has operated. The certification of localized bargaining 
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units is évidence of the design ; the power of the rank and file in the 
unit to accept or reject settlement is évidence of the opération. 
The présence of a national labour congress does not negate the 
independence of affiliate unions nor the separate status of union locals 
within the collective bargaining System. Similarly the existence of national 
organizations representing and serving the interests of employers in the 
private sector does not negate nor attenuate the responsibility of the 
individual employer and the prédilection for individualistic behaviour 
which is characteristic of private enterprise and the free market. 
I am quite aware of significant cases of industry — wide collective 
bargaining and of country-wide bargaining under the fédéral law. The 
labour movement has organized itself to match the structure of the three 
sphères or levels of government in Canada and employers hâve coalesced 
to match the structure of the labour movement and its de facto impact 
on the collective bargaining process. Employers' organizations also hâve 
drifted apart under the thrust of compétition, and drifted together again 
under the force of confrontation. Divide and rule is a strategy which has 
its antidote in the counter-strategy of squaring off at the bargaining table. 
It raises the incidental question of which is the prevailing and which the 
countervailing power. 
Ail thèse activities evolved, I submit, within a gênerai context of 
pluralism and within a Gompers-style perception of collective bargaining : 
to get out of the prevailing économie system ail that the process will 
permit. I believe this characterization continued to be accurate even after 
the introduction of collective bargaining in the fédéral public service : 
the philosophy of the législation and the opération of collective bargaining 
are consonant with that characterization. 
It is easy to say we are in the midst of change. It is much less easy to 
detect with confidence the direction of change : to identify a médium 
to long term trend relevant to policy détermination as distinct from short 
term shifts which invite pragmatic recalculations of tactics and stratégies. 
We should not, however, avoid the question because its formulation is 
difficult or the answers unclear. If we can but « see through a glass 
darkly » then so be it. 
The trend to bigness is a centralizing force, and an external threat 
is a centralizing stimulant. The process or institution that émerges from 
the stimulation is designed to contend with that threat and possesses 
enduring qualities, interests and objectives often congruent with but 
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nonetheless distinguishable from those of progenitor Systems. The con-
ditions in Canada over the past few years — économie, political, social, 
psychological — of which inflation has become the evil symbol, are a 
threat to the collective bargaining System. That threat and the trend to 
bigness are centripetal factors which are causing coalescences with ca-
pacities, interests and objectives beyond conventional collective bargaining. 
In short, I suggest there is an evolving centralization and politieization of 
organisms conventionally associated with collective bargaining, but geared 
to perform a rôle beyond collective bargaining. The political rôle of the 
labour movement has heretofore been uneven and, outside Québec, inef-
fectuai compared with the closest external prototypes in the United States 
and the United Kingdom, or with those in numerous other western de-
mocracies. In the United States John L. Lewis may hâve set his own 
ambush in 1940 in pitting his job against the re-election of Président 
Roosevelt, but George Meany continues to ride tall in the political saddle. 
In the United Kingdom the Labour Party is the créature of the labour 
movement, and the government of the day finds itself negotiating with 
its creator on critical économie policy in the name of a latter-day Social 
Contract. In western European countries the negotiation of national 
wage rates, from which local and régional rates may drift upward, is 
really the negotiation of a pièce of national économie policy. 
If the unsuccessful efforts of the fédéral government to reach con-
sensus on voluntary wage and price restraint are évidence of evolving 
rôles, we are witnessing substantial change in the realistic interests and 
attainable objectives of the labour movement within which conventional 
collective bargaining may hâve a comparatively minor place. It may be 
that the answer last spring to the quest for voluntary restraint was « no » 
because centralizing forces do not yet surpass the needs and wants of 
pluralism. To put it more bluntly, perhaps the answer had to be « no » 
because respondents could not deliver on an affirmative one. The event 
nevertheless may be a significant failure as a foretoken of transformation 
in de facto political structures. Not only can it happen hère : it may be 
happening hère. 
I don't know the answers. Two and a half décades of hindsight 
suggest to me that there is no « final solution » which is capable of 
supporting life and growth ; nor should we expect one, for a dynamic 
society knows no « Final Act ». In the long thrust of history perhaps in 
the industrial world of the west we are at last in a period of post-conjugal 
let-down, and we hâve not got a grip on reality. As society continues and 
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civilization survives, the processes or stratagems or devices by which hu-
man beings relate on issues of public interest will be reworked and new de-
vices or new forms of old devices will appear ; that is one of the ways in 
which « society » will change with time and will, for those with long and 
gentle memories, turn the présent into « the good old days ». Who among 
you wants collective bargaining any way ? 
Qui veut la négociation collective ? 
La négociation collective se justifie comme mesure d'intérêt public parce qu'elle 
est un des systèmes de relations du travail qui tient le mieux compte des valeurs 
sur lesquelles repose notre régime social et économique. On peut aussi la défendre 
en s'appuyant sur l'argument qu'« elle offre une agora appropriée pour discuter 
librement et sans contrainte de solutions multiples et que pareille façon d'agir 
l'emporte sur toute autre, même si l'on met de côté toute considération morale 
touchant la liberté et autres valeurs ». 
La négociation collective se fonde sur un double paradoxe qui influence à 
la fois son utilisation et la conception que l'on s'en fait, soit une lutte discontinue 
entre des intérêts collectifs opposés et aussi un agent puissant d'action politique, 
ce qui va du fait évident que la négociation collective est en soi une forme d'action 
collective jusqu'à son utilisation comme instrument ultérieur de transformation poli-
tique, sociale et économique. 
Cinq dangers semblent planer à l'heure actuelle sur le régime de la négociation 
collective : une augmentation alarmante du nombre d'heures-homme de travail 
perdues à cause des arrêts de travail associés au nombre accru de rejets par les 
travailleurs de la base des projets de règlement, une intensification considérable 
d'accords sur les salaires qui dépassent à la fois le taux d'inflation et l'indice d'ac-
croissement de la productivité nationale, une amplification marquée des grèves 
illégales et des autres formes d'activité illicite, la politisation croissante des conflits 
et l'accentuation des préjudices publics et privés découlant des conflits dans les 
services essentiels. 
La cause de ces dangers, ce sont le chômage, le manque à produire et l'in-
flation, qui poussent à une espèce de désengagement où l'individu devient indifférent 
aux conséquences de ses réclamations. La négociation collective n'a jamais été 
conçue pour détendre de pareilles tensions. On ne peut demander qu'elle soit seule 
à en porter le poids et elle ne peut assumer l'entière responsabilité. 
Par conséquent, nous devons éviter de rejeter à la hâte et pour de faux motifs 
la négociation collective comme instrument d'action collective, même si, à l'intérieur 
du régime de négociation collective, il existe certaines possibilités de bonifier le 
système dans les conditions actuelles. Toute amélioration durable du fonctionnement 
de la négociation collective ne pourra provenir que d'une clarification de l'atmosphère 
de façon à réconcilier entre elles les valeurs qui motivent la négociation collective 
en tant que mesure d'intérêt public. 
